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cause underinvestment.
 2012 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen
University and City University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The global ﬁnancial and economic crisis between 2007 and 2010 triggered a fresh debate about the role of
the government in the economy and highlighted the importance of understanding how ﬁnancing frictions
aﬀect ﬁrm investment and the economy (Kashyap and Zingales, 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et al.,
2010). To shed some light on this issue, we investigate how government control aﬀects capital allocationurnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of
ier B.V. All rights reserved.
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after three decades of privatization, state-owned ﬁrms still make up the bulk of China’s economy. China’s
heavily government-controlled economy, together with an emerging and rapidly developing private sector,
provides us with an excellent opportunity to examine this issue. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether during
the regulatory screening process of seasoned equity oﬀering (SEO) applications, non-state-controlled and
state-controlled ﬁrms are treated diﬀerently, and how their subsequent investment and stock performance
are aﬀected diﬀerently by regulatory decisions.
We ﬁnd that state ﬁrms are more likely than non-state ﬁrms to receive regulatory approval to conduct
SEOs, even though state ﬁrms have fewer growth opportunities than non-state ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, during
the period between 1999 and 2003, about 57% of ﬁrms successfully passed the regulatory screening process
and completed stock oﬀerings. However, the success rate for state ﬁrms is about 39% higher than that for
non-state ﬁrms.
Further, we ﬁnd that non-state ﬁrms’ investment and stock performance aremore sensitive to regulatory deci-
sions than those of state ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the median growth rate in net property, plant and equipment in non-
state ﬁrms which successfully pass the screening process is 35% (16%) in the ﬁrst (second) year after receiving
regulatory decisions, whereas the rate for non-state ﬁrms denied approval is only 3% in each year. In contrast,
state ﬁrms denied approval to issue equity do not invest less than state ﬁrms receiving approval to issue equity.
Furthermore, in the 2-year period following regulatory decisions, non-state ﬁrms receiving approval to issue
equity outperform size-matched non-SEO ﬁrms by about 26%, whereas non-state ﬁrms denied approval under-
perform the benchmark by about 11% during the same period. In contrast, the long-run stock performance of
state ﬁrms is barely aﬀected by regulatory decisions and is not diﬀerent from that of non-SEO ﬁrms.
Finally, we ﬁnd that political connections help non-state ﬁrms overcome regulatory hurdles when they seek
additional capital. Non-state ﬁrms with political connections have a signiﬁcantly greater chance of surviving
the screening process than those without political connections. Further, the chance of surviving the screening
process for politically connected non-state ﬁrms is comparable to that of state ﬁrms.
Financial economists argue that capital allocation skewed toward constrained ﬁrms or individuals will dis-
proportionately beneﬁt them and therefore improve allocation eﬃciency (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and
Bolton, 1997; Galor and Moav, 2004; Claessens and Perotti, 2007; Zia, 2008). Financially constrained non-
state ﬁrms should beneﬁt more from raising equity capital than state ﬁrms. Giving priority to state ﬁrms dis-
torts capital allocation and hampers the growth of non-state ﬁrms.
We contribute to the growing literature which examines how political forces aﬀect capital allocation around
the world (Claessens and Perotti, 2007).1 Our work diﬀers from extant studies in two ways. First, we identify a
mechanism, the screening of stock issuers, through which the government directly controls capital allocations.
Thus, we are able to obtain direct evidence on how government control aﬀects the allocation outcome. In con-
trast, extant studies often compare ﬁnancial outcomes between politically connected and non-politically con-
nected ﬁrms, and indirectly infer politicians’ inﬂuence on capital allocations. Second, we focus on the
allocation of equity capital, whereas most extant studies examine the allocation of bank credit. Governments
in many countries have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on equity capital allocation. Our work provides new and direct
evidence that assists researchers and regulators in gaining a better understanding of how political forces aﬀect
access to ﬁnance and capital allocation eﬃciency.
Further, our work is linked to the literature on the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’ investment and
growth. Most studies on ﬁnancial constraints focus on ﬁrm characteristics such as cash ﬂow and leverage, and
interpret the response of investment to changes in these characteristics as evidence that ﬁnancial constraints
aﬀect investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Campello et al., 2010). However, changes in these characteristics are
likely correlated with the availability of investment opportunities (Kaplan and Zingales, 2000). This
endogeneity issue can be mitigated by comparing the response of ﬁrms with diﬀering degrees of ﬁnancing
constraints to the same shock. China has two types of ﬁrms, controlled by the state and the private sector
(non-state entrepreneurs) respectively, which have diﬀering degrees of ﬁnancial constraints (Allen et al.,1 Studies along this line include La Porta et al. (2002), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Sapienza (2004), Dinc (2005), Khwaja and Mian
(2005), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), Claessens et al. (2008), Zia (2008), and Fan et al. (2008).
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cants. Comparing the responses of non-state and state ﬁrms to regulatory decisions generates robust evidence
about the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on investment.
In addition, we provide direct evidence that political connections bring beneﬁts to non-state ﬁrms. This
result furthers our understanding of the rationale for businesses to build political ties (Fisman, 2001; Faccio,
2006; Faccio and Parsley, 2009). Our study also provides evidence corroborating the notion that the develop-
ment of the private sector in China is likely supported by informal ﬁnancing channels (Allen et al., 2005).
Finally, our paper is relevant to the current debate on the role of the government in the economy amid a
global ﬁnancial and economic crisis. To combat the current global economic recession, countries around the
world have been expanding the role of the government. While various measures aimed at stimulating the econ-
omy may temporarily ease problems such as high unemployment, a frozen credit market and a potential col-
lapse of major industries or ﬁrms, they come with their own unique agency problems. These agency problems
may steer resources away from sectors where they are most needed and thus can be used more eﬃciently. For
example, one concern raised by industry leaders is the presence of conﬂicts of interest when governments
become both the regulator and the regulated. Small and non-state ﬁrms could face diﬃculties competing
against ﬁrms owned by the government.3 While the economic and institutional setting in China is diﬀerent
to that of developed countries and we are hesitant to extrapolate excessively, results from our analysis could
be of reference to these economies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains SEO regulations in China and develops our
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and data. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section
5 extends our main analysis and presents results of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
2.1. Seasoned equity oﬀering regulations in China
Chinese listed ﬁrms seeking to issue new shares must go through a lengthy approval process. First, a ﬁrm’s
board of directors has to approve the SEO plan. Once the plan has received board approval, the ﬁrm must
immediately announce the preliminary oﬀering plan. The preliminary plan usually details the type of oﬀering
proposed, the estimated number of shares to be oﬀered, the estimated oﬀering proceeds and the projects to be
funded.4 The ﬁrm then calls a shareholder meeting to seek approval of the plan from shareholders. Because
controlling shareholders usually dominate both at the board meeting and at the shareholder meeting, a plan
that has received board approval is almost invariably approved at the shareholder meeting.5 The ﬁrst share-
holder meeting notice must be sent out at least one month before the scheduled meeting date. The minimum
time interval between the board announcement and the shareholder meeting resolution is therefore one month.
After obtaining approval at the shareholder meeting, the ﬁrm’s management will invite investment bankers,
auditors and lawyers to prepare an oﬀering application. The oﬀering application must ﬁrst be endorsed by
the local oﬃce of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in the region where the ﬁrm is incor-
porated. After obtaining the local regulatory endorsement, the ﬁrm’s management is required to submit the
application to the CSRC for approval. The application typically includes the oﬀering plan and ﬁnancial state-
ments from the past 3 years. The oﬀering is usually made within a few days of CSRC approval.2 Besides Allen et al. (2005), Brandt and Li (2003), Li et al. (2007), and Wang et al. (2008) also argue that private ﬁrms (non-state ﬁrms)
are discriminated by state banks, and thus more constrained ﬁnancially than state ﬁrms.
3 Phillips, Maha Khan. The new political economy. CFA Magazine September–October 2009.
4 Chinese companies can issue new shares to existing shareholders (right oﬀerings) or to all public investors (general oﬀerings). In our
sample period, both rights oﬀerings and general oﬀerings are present.
5 A new regulation issued in 2004 requires an oﬀering plan be approved by both the majority of all outstanding votes and the majority of
all outstanding public votes. Some oﬀering plans proposed after this date received board approval but failed to be approved at the
shareholders meeting because of opposition from public shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). We focus on ﬁrms announcing SEO proposals
before 2004 to avoid the confounding impact of this regulation.
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guidelines include CSRC [1999] 12, CSRC [2000] 42 and CSRC [2001] 43. These regulations specify positive
requirements that SEO applicants must meet and negative criteria that may result in approvals being denied.
These qualiﬁcations typically include both hard requirements, such as proﬁtability thresholds, and soft
requirements, such as governance quality. Other than proﬁtability requirements, the positive and negative cri-
teria speciﬁed in the various guidelines are mostly similar. CSRC [1999] 12 requires SEO applicants to have a
minimum average ROE of 10% over the past 3 years and a minimum ROE of 6% in any of the past 3 years.
CSRC [2001] 43 lowers the proﬁtability threshold, requiring an average ROE of no lower than 6% over the
past 3 years. We list the mandatory criteria under CSRC [1999] 12 in Appendix A. These guidelines suggest
that the screening process is aimed at identifying high-performing, well-governed ﬁrms. However, the guide-
lines also leave suﬃcient room for regulators to exercise their discretion in selecting applicants.
Firms seeking equity oﬀerings may also be forced to cancel their oﬀering plans before they submit applica-
tions to the CSRC due to explicit or implicit signals from regulators that their proposals are unlikely to be
approved. Such signals can be conveyed via unfavorable regulatory decisions made with respect to similar
ﬁrms, informal discussions with regulators or regulators’ informal policy announcements.
2.2. Analytical framework
To assess capital allocation eﬃciency, we follow the analytical framework of Claessens and Perotti (2007).
They suggest that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms or individuals should beneﬁt more from the relaxation of ﬁnan-
cial constraints than unconstrained ﬁrms. Therefore, giving preferred capital access to constrained ﬁrms or
individuals improves capital allocation eﬃciency and facilitates economic growth. This analytical framework
is built on Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Galor and Moav (2004). To apply this anal-
ysis, scholars usually compare the responses of two types of ﬁrms with diﬀering degrees of ﬁnancial constraints
to exogenous shocks to capital availability and then make inferences. Zia (2008) presents a speciﬁc example of
applying this analytical framework by comparing the production and performance between public and private
ﬁrms subsequent to the removal of subsidized government export loans in Pakistan. He ﬁnds that the perfor-
mance and production of public ﬁrms, which are considered less ﬁnancially constrained than private ﬁrms, are
not aﬀected by the removal of subsidized loans, while the production and performance of private ﬁrms are
greatly adversely aﬀected. This is because public ﬁrms are able to substitute subsidized loans with commercial
bank credit, while private ﬁrms are not. He thus concludes that the initial allocation of subsidized loans to
public ﬁrms is ineﬃcient. Following this framework, we ﬁrst examine whether non-state and state ﬁrms are
treated diﬀerently in the regulatory process regarding their SEO applications, and then examine how their sub-
sequent investment and stock performance are aﬀected diﬀerently by regulatory decisions.
2.3. Hypothesis development
2.3.1. Political forces and capital allocation
A growing literature examines how political forces aﬀect capital allocation. This literature generally con-
cludes that capital is allocated based on political favoritism if politicians can exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over
the allocation process (La Porta et al., 2002; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja
and Mian, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Zia, 2008; Fan
et al., 2008). Both intuition and anecdotal evidence suggest that governments or politicians likely intervene
in regulators’ decisions in an eﬀort to ensure that priority is given to state ﬁrms in their pursuit of capital.
When the government controls the capital allocation process, state ﬁrms could receive favorable treatment
for several reasons. First, state ﬁrms are often required to fulﬁll social objectives such as supporting employ-
ment, investing in public projects and maintaining social stability. In exchange, the government gives ﬁnancial
support to state ﬁrms. When necessary, the government can also intervene in regulatory decisions and give
favorable treatment to state ﬁrms. Second, state ﬁrms are more likely than non-state ﬁrms to have political
connections. Executives of state ﬁrms are often de facto government oﬃcials and are thus more likely to have
ties with regulators (Fan et al., 2007). Political connections enable state ﬁrms to inﬂuence regulatory decisions.
Third, regulators are more willing to approve state ﬁrms’ equity issuance requests because potential liabilities
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ital to non-state ﬁrms. For example, state ﬁrms are less likely to go bankrupt because the government is more
likely to bail out state ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress than they are to rescue non-state ﬁrms. Even when state ﬁrms
can also go bankrupt, regulators face less onerous liabilities when they allocate state resources to failed state
ﬁrms than to failed non-state ﬁrms. Extant studies ﬁnd that state banks lend more to state ﬁrms or politically
connected ﬁrms for the above reasons (La Porta et al., 2002; Dinc, 2005).
Previous studies suggest that in comparison with their state counterparts, non-state ﬁrms in China are dis-
criminated against by state banks. Allen et al. (2005) show that the amount of bank credit extended to the non-
state sector in China is much lower than that extended to the state sector, in spite of the fact that the former
account for a larger share of production than the latter. Wang et al. (2008) suggest that because state-controlled
ﬁrms in China have preferential access to bank credit and are more likely to be bailed out in the event of ﬁnan-
cial distress, they lack incentives to employ high-quality auditors. We examine how government intervention
impacts the availability of equity to state versus non-state ﬁrms and propose our ﬁrst hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 1. State ﬁrms are treated more favorably by regulators in the seasoned equity oﬀering screening
process than non-state ﬁrms.2.3.2. Sensitivities of investment and stock performance to regulatory screening decisions
Even though state ﬁrms are likely treated more favorably by the government in the equity allocation pro-
cess, they are often less ﬁnancially constrained than non-state ﬁrms. They can more easily access state banks
and receive other forms of government favors, such as tax rebates or subsidies than non-state ﬁrms (Khwaja
and Mian, 2005; Allen et al., 2005). Therefore, state ﬁrms are ﬁnancially less reliant on the seasoned equity
market. Non-state ﬁrms, on the other hand, have diﬃculties obtaining bank loans. They are less likely to
obtain direct ﬁnancial support from the government. Receiving approval to raise capital through issuing
new shares enables them to capture investment opportunities and achieve growth, whereas failure to receive
approval to raise capital forces them to abandon valuable investment opportunities and therefore forfeit
growth. The ﬁnance literature suggests a negative association between ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁrm invest-
ment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1996; Stein, 2003; Desai et al., 2008; Almeida and Campello, 2010).
We use the ultimate controlling shareholder, state versus non-state owners, as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraints
and examine ﬁrms’ responses to regulatory decisions on equity issuances. We predict that ﬁnancially con-
strained non-state ﬁrms should exhibit a more pronounced sensitivity of investment to regulatory decisions
regarding SEO applications than state ﬁrms.
We also predict that non-state ﬁrms’ post-decision stock performance is more sensitive to regulatory deci-
sions than that of state ﬁrms. Realizing that non-state ﬁrms may have diﬃculties implementing investment
opportunities, investors rationally discount the value of those opportunities before observing regulatory deci-
sions. If non-state ﬁrms receive approval to issue equity, then investors revise upward their expectations that
investment opportunities will be realized and therefore drive up these ﬁrms’ stock prices. Otherwise, stock
prices plunge for non-state ﬁrms denied approval because investors become increasingly concerned about
the ability of such ﬁrms to capture investment opportunities. Stock performance of state ﬁrms is less likely
to be aﬀected by regulatory decisions because investors are less likely to worry about state ﬁrms’ ability to
implement investment projects and thus are less likely to discount their value before receiving regulatory deci-
sions. Based on the above argument, we propose our second hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 2. The sensitivities of subsequent investment and stock performance to regulatory decisions on the
seasoned equity oﬀering screening process are more pronounced for non-state ﬁrms than for state ﬁrms.3. Sample and data
3.1. Sample selection
We manually collect stock oﬀering proposals announced between 1999 and 2003 in the corporate
announcement database in WIND, which is a leading integrated ﬁnancial data service provider in China.
Table 1
Sample selection. The original sample contains all ﬁrms that announced stock oﬀering plans from 1999 through 2003. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a
state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are
individuals.
Original sample 883
Exclude:
Firms for which the ultimate controlling shareholders cannot be identiﬁed or for which required accounting or stock
return data is missing
42
Firms which did not put their proposals to a shareholder vote 44
Firms for which the ultimate controlling shareholders are universities, foreigners or collective enterprises 61
Final sample 736
Of which:
Non-state ﬁrms 88
State ﬁrms 648
106 O.Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 101–125The sample period starts from 1999 because corporate announcements made before 1999 are not available in
the WIND database. We end the sample period before 2004 because most SEO plans announced in 2004 and
2005 were not processed by the CSRC due to a share reform that began in 2005.6 As detailed below, we exam-
ine the operating and stock performance of ﬁrms 2 years after they receive regulatory decisions. The account-
ing and stock return data used in this study, hence, are up to 2006. We track each proposal to determine
whether it was submitted to be voted on at a shareholder meeting and implemented within a year of receiving
shareholder approval. Accounting and stock return data are obtained from the China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The ultimate controlling shareholder(s) of each sample ﬁrm is
(are) manually collected from annual reports and we classify them into the following types: state, universities,
collective enterprises (including town–village enterprises), domestic individuals and miscellaneous. A ﬁrm is
deﬁned as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are domestic individuals, and deﬁned as
a state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholder is the government.
We obtain a total of 883 ﬁrms which announced SEO proposals between 1999 and 2003. We delete 42 ﬁrms
whose ultimate controlling shareholders cannot be identiﬁed or for which required accounting or stock return
data is missing, 44 ﬁrms which did not forward their proposals for shareholder approval and 61 ﬁrms whose
ultimate controlling shareholders were universities, town–village enterprises or miscellaneous types. If a pro-
posal was not submitted for shareholder approval, we assume that the ﬁrm voluntarily cancelled its stock
oﬀering plan. Such ﬁrms are excluded because we study regulatory decisions. The ratio of voluntarily cancelled
proposals to all proposals (about 5%) is close to that in the United States (Clarke et al., 2001). Universities and
town–village enterprises are diﬀerent from non-state ﬁrms in that they are quasi-state-owned, which makes it
possible that ﬁrms controlled by universities or collective enterprises receive favorable treatment from the gov-
ernment. For example, Brandt and Li (2003) ﬁnd that town–village enterprises in China are more likely to
obtain bank credit than privately owned ﬁrms. We exclude these ﬁrms from our tests. The ﬁnal sample consists
of 736 ﬁrms. Among these ﬁrms, 648 are state ﬁrms and 88 are non-state ﬁrms. This statistic is consistent with
the fact that the majority of listed ﬁrms in China are still government-controlled. In fact, Bortolotti and Faccio
(2009) ﬁnd that, contrary to conventional wisdom, many partially privatized ﬁrms in OECD countries remain
in government hands. Table 1 shows the sample selection process.
A proposal approved by a ﬁrm’s shareholders is subject to a validity period of, in most cases, 1 year from
the date on which shareholders approve the proposal. A ﬁrm must announce a new proposal and call another
shareholder meeting to approve it if the proposal is not implemented within the validity period but the man-
agement still wants to issue shares. We therefore deﬁne a ﬁrm as a successful ﬁrm if its proposal is imple-
mented within a year of shareholder approval. Likewise, a ﬁrm is deﬁned as an unsuccessful ﬁrm if its6 In the early stage of China’s stock markets, shares held by pre-IPO owners were not tradable. Only stocks held by public shareholders
could be legally traded. In 2005, the Chinese government announced its intention to convert all non-tradable shares into tradable shares.
This share reform program began in 2005 and was largely completed by 2007. Since then, all shares have been tradable. The CSRC
suspended the processing of IPO applications in 2005 and resumed it in mid-2006.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its
ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. Success equals 1 if a ﬁrm successfully oﬀers stock within 1 year of receiving shareholder
approval for an oﬀering proposal and 0 otherwise. Return on Assets is the average return on assets for the 3 years immediately before the
year in which the board announces an oﬀering proposal. Cash Ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Leverage is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Capitalization is the market value of equity. Growth in sales, cash ratio, leverage, assets, sales, and
capitalization are based on the corresponding values in the year immediately preceding the year of the board announcement on the oﬀering
proposal.Market Run-up is the equal-weighted market return over the 12-month period before the board announcement date. Diﬀerences
in means (medians) between state and non-state ﬁrms are compared and p-values are reported in the last two columns. P-values that are
0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests).
Variable All (N = 736) Non-state ﬁrms (N = 88) State ﬁrms (N = 638) Diﬀerence
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Success 0.57 1 0.45 0 0.59 1 0.02 0.02
Growth in Sales 27% 20% 36% 29% 26% 18% 0.01 0.00
Return on Assets 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 0.39 0.28
Cash Ratio 13% 11% 13% 12% 14% 11% 0.39 0.94
Leverage 42% 42% 44% 45% 42% 42% 0.20 0.21
Assets (Million) 1580 1045 1033 772 1654 1141 0.00 0.00
Capitalization (Million) 3354 2579 3137 2529 3384 2604 0.46 0.30
Sales (Million) 555 506 363 398 589 531 0.00 0.00
Market Run-up 20% 23% 14% 13% 21% 23% 0.05 0.05
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ﬁrms, or 57% of the ﬁnal sample, are successful ﬁrms, and 316, or 43% of the ﬁnal sample, are unsuccessful
ﬁrms.73.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for the two sub-samples of state and non-
state ﬁrms separately. We ﬁnd that the success rate for state ﬁrms (59%) is signiﬁcantly higher than that
for non-state ﬁrms (45%). We also report statistics on growth potential, proﬁtability, internal fund status,
leverage, market conditions and ﬁrm size because the guidelines issued by the CSRC suggest that these are
important factors inﬂuencing regulators’ decisions or, as predicted by capital structure theories, they are
important determinants of ﬁrms’ decisions to issue equity. Capital structure theories (Myers, 2003) suggest
that ﬁrms with investment opportunities issue equity if they are already highly levered and do not have suf-
ﬁcient internal funds.8 Booth et al. (2001) show that major capital structure theories are portable to developing
countries. Following Morck et al. (1988), many studies use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities.
Tobin’s Q, however, is endogenous to corporate governance quality and ﬁnancial constraints (Durnev and
Kim, 2005). In our setting, Tobin’s Q also suﬀers from an endogeneity problem since we argue that stock val-
uation prior to receiving regulatory decisions regarding SEOs reﬂects investors’ expectation about the likeli-
hood of the approval of the oﬀering plan. Hence, Tobin’s Q is not a good measure for investment
opportunities in our setting. We use Growth in Sales as a proxy for investment opportunities, following
Durnev and Kim (2005). We use Return on Assets to measure proﬁtability. We use Cash Ratio as a proxy
for internal fund suﬃciency and Leverage as a proxy for debt capacity. Firm size, as measured by the market
value of equity, total assets or total sales, is used as another proxy for debt capacity because large ﬁrms have a7 Chen and Yuan (2004) investigate whether regulators are able to see through earnings management by rights oﬀering applicants. Their
sample period is from 1996 to 1998. They obtain their data from the CSRC and show that about 25% of ﬁrms which submit applications to
the CSRC are denied approval. The unsuccessful rate in our sample is 43%, which is higher than theirs. Our classiﬁcation approach
considers those SEO proposals that are implicitly or explicitly rejected by the CSRC before the ﬁrms submit those proposals, and those
that are rejected by regional oﬃces of the CSRC.
8 Major capital structure theories include pecking order theory, trade-oﬀ theory, and agency theory (see a review by Myers (2003)).
These theories generally agree that ﬁrms with growth opportunities but having diﬃcult ﬁnancing them with internal funds or new loans are
good candidates for new equity issuance.
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conditions may imply the presence of investment opportunities (Pastor and Veronesi, 2005). The deﬁnitions
of major variables are given in Appendix B. The distribution of growth rates, including Growth in Sales
and Growth in PPE/Growth in Assets (deﬁned later), are highly skewed. To minimize the inﬂuence of outliers,
we winsorize growth rates at the top and bottom 5% levels.
Table 2 shows that non-state ﬁrms experience faster sales growth than state ﬁrms, suggesting that the
former have more investment opportunities than the latter. State ﬁrms are larger than non-state ﬁrms when
measured by total assets or sales, but not in terms of market capitalization, suggesting that investors value
non-state ﬁrms more than state ﬁrms. This is likely due to the fact that non-state ﬁrms grow more rapidly than
their state-owned counterparts. Market conditions before oﬀering announcements are typically better for state
ﬁrms than for non-state ﬁrms. Overall, univariate results suggest that non-state ﬁrms are less likely to pass the
screening process than their state-controlled counterparts, although they appear to have more investment
opportunities.4. Main analysis
4.1. Determinants of successful oﬀerings
We run the following logistic regression to determine whether state and non-state ﬁrms are treated diﬀer-
ently in the SEO regulatory screening process:ProbðSuccessitÞ ¼ a0 þ a1 Stateit þ a2Growth in Salesit þ a3Returns on Assetsit þ a4Market Run-upit
þ a5Cash Ratioit þ a6 Leverageit þ a7 Log of Capitalizationit þ a8 Periodit þ eit; ð1Þwhere the dependent variable, Success, is a dummy variable that equals one for a successful ﬁrm and zero
otherwise. We include State to indicate the type of ultimate controlling shareholder. State equals one for a
state ﬁrm and zero otherwise. The control variables include Growth in Sales, Return on Assets, Market
Run-up, Cash Ratio, Leverage and Log of Capitalization. As discussed earlier, the 2001 CSRC guidelines low-
ered the basic proﬁtability requirement ﬁrms must meet to qualify for stock oﬀerings. To control for theTable 3
Determinants of successful oﬀerings. The dependent variable is Success. Success equals 1 if a ﬁrm successfully oﬀers stock
within 1 year of receiving shareholder approval for its oﬀering proposal and 0 otherwise. State equals 1 if a ﬁrm’s ultimate
controlling shareholder is the state and 0 otherwise. Return on Assets is the average return on assets for the 3 years
immediately before the year in which the board announces an oﬀering proposal. Cash Ratio is the ratio of cash and cash
equivalents to assets. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Capitalization is the market value of equity. Growth in
sales, cash ratio, leverage, and capitalization are based on the corresponding values in the year immediately preceding the
year of the board announcement on the oﬀering proposal. Market Run-up is the equal-weighted market return over the
12-month period before the board announcement date. Period equals 1 if a board announcement is made after 2001 and 0
otherwise. P-values that are 0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests).
All
Estimate p-Value
Intercept 8.81 0.00
State 0.64 0.01
Growth in Sales 0.39 0.14
Return on Assets 18.83 0.00
Market Run-up 1.45 0.00
Cash ratio 2.24 0.02
Leverage 1.64 0.03
Log of Capitalization 0.50 0.00
Period Dummy 0.67 0.02
N 736
Pseudo R-square 19.00%
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iod which takes the value of one if a stock oﬀering plan announcement was made after 2001 and zero
otherwise.
Results, reported in Table 3, conﬁrm ﬁndings of our univariate tests, i.e., state ﬁrms are much more likely to
survive the screening process than non-state ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient on State is positive and signiﬁcant (0.64,
p = 0.01), supporting Hypothesis 1. This coeﬃcient estimate means that if the values of all the other variables
are held at their sample means, the probability of a state ﬁrm surviving the screening process is 57%, whereas
that for a non-state ﬁrm is 41%. Hence, a representative state ﬁrm is 39% [(57%  41%)/41%] more likely to
pass the screening process than a typical non-state ﬁrm.
Among the control variables, it appears that market conditions play an important role in regulators’ deci-
sions. The coeﬃcient estimate on Market Run-up is positive and signiﬁcant (1.45, p = 0.00), suggesting that a
ﬁrm is much more likely to receive approval when market conditions are favorable. The coeﬃcient on Lever-
age is positive and signiﬁcant (1.64, p = 0.03) and the coeﬃcient on Cash Ratio is signiﬁcantly negative (2.24,
p = 0.02), suggesting that regulators tend to approve equity issuance applications made by ﬁrms with insuﬃ-
cient internal funds or high leverage. The coeﬃcient on Period is negative and signiﬁcant (0.67, p = 0.02),
suggesting that the success rate fell after the CSRC relaxed its proﬁtability requirement, probably due to
an increase in the number of qualiﬁed SEO candidates. The major proxy for investment opportunities, Growth
in Sales, however, is not signiﬁcantly related to regulatory decisions (0.39, p = 0.14).4.2. Investment growth after regulatory decisions
In this subsection, we investigate new investment made during the period after regulatory decisions regard-
ing SEO applications. We deﬁne the year in which the screening outcome is determined as Year 0 and examine
growth in investment in Year 1 and Year 2.9 Investment includes expenditure on property, plant and equip-
ment (PPE), as well as on inventories, sales credit and research and development (Stein, 2003). Hence, growth
in investment is manifested in growth in PPE and growth in accounts receivable, inventories and intangible
assets. Following Desai et al. (2008), we use growth in net PPE to capture new capital expenditure and use
growth in total assets to capture total new investment. Total assets include cash and cash equivalents that
are not normally considered investment. We therefore calculate growth in total assets adjusted for cash and
short-term investment. Speciﬁcally, these measures are constructed in the following way:9 Bec
decisioGrowth in PPEi;t ¼ PPEi;t  PPEi;t1PPEi;t1 ; ð2Þ
Growth in Assetsi;t ¼ Adj: Assetsi;t  Adj: Assetsi;t1Adj: Assetsi;t1 : ð3ÞFig. 1 plots Growth in PPE and Growth in Assets for non-state and state ﬁrms. These ﬁgures demonstrate
that both capital expenditure and total investment grow more rapidly in successful non-state ﬁrms than in
unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. Although the investment of successful state ﬁrms also grows faster than that
of unsuccessful state ﬁrms, the diﬀerence is not as pronounced as that between successful and unsuccessful
non-state ﬁrms.
In Table 4, we present results of formal tests for the diﬀerence between the groups in the growth rate of
investment. Panel A shows that investment in successful non-state ﬁrms grows much faster than it does in
unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. The mean (median) growth rate in PPE for successful non-state ﬁrms is 36%
(35%) in Year 1 and 27% (16%) in Year 2, whereas the mean (median) growth rate in PPE for unsuccessful
non-state ﬁrms is 12% (3%) in Year 1 and 6% (3%) in Year 2. Although successful state ﬁrms also invest more
than unsuccessful state ﬁrms, the gap between them is not as pronounced as that between successful and
unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. The mean (median) growth rate in PPE for successful state ﬁrms is 20%
(14%) for Year 1 and 15% (10%) for Year 2, whereas the mean (median) growth rate in PPE for unsuccessfulause most sample ﬁrms do not formally announce the cancellation of stock oﬀering proposals, we estimate the year when regulatory
ns are made. The estimation procedure is described in detail in a later section.
Fig. 1. Investment growth after regulatory decisions. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a successful ﬁrm if it successfully oﬀers stock within 1 year of
receiving shareholder approval for the proposal and is deﬁned as an unsuccessful ﬁrm otherwise. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its
ultimate controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. Year 0 is
the year in which the regulatory decision on a ﬁrm’s stock oﬀering proposal is made. Growth in PPE and Growth in Assets (adjusted by
Cash and short-term investments) are calculated in the following ways:
Growth in PPE ¼ PPEt  PPEt1
PPEt1
Growth in Assets ¼ Adj: Assetst  Adj: Assetst1
Adj: Assetst1
Panels A and B plot Growth in PPE and Growth in Assets by non-state ﬁrms, respectively; Panels C and D plot Growth in PPE and Growth
in Assets by state ﬁrms, respectively.
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adjusted assets.
Because investment is aﬀected by other factors such as the presence of investment opportunities and funds
from other sources which could also be associated with regulatory decisions, we run the following multivariate
regression to determine the impact of regulatory decisions on investment among SEO applicants in the long
run:Growth in PPEit=Assetsit ¼ b0 þ b1 Stateit þ b2 Successit þ b3 Stateit  Successit þ b4Growth in Salesit
þ b5Return on Assetsit þ b6Market Run-upit þ b7Cash Ratioit
þ b8 Leverageit þ b9 Log of Capitalizationit þ b10 Periodit þ fit; ð4Þ
Table 4
Investment growth after regulatory decisions. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a successful ﬁrm if it successfully oﬀers stock within 1 year of receiving
shareholder approval for the proposal and is deﬁned as an unsuccessful ﬁrm otherwise. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its ultimate
controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. Year 0 is the year in
which the regulatory decision on a ﬁrm’s stock oﬀering proposal is made. Growth in PPE and Growth in Assets (adjusted by cash and cash
equivalents) are calculated in the following ways:
Growth in PPE ¼ PPEt  PPEt1
PPEt1
Growth in Assets ¼ Adj: Assetst  Adj: Assetst1
Adj: Assetst1
P-values that are 0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests). In Panel B, p-values are after correction for
heteroskedasticity.
N All Non-state ﬁrms State ﬁrms
Successful Unsuccessful Diﬀerence Successful Unsuccessful Diﬀerence
736 40 48 383 265
Panel A: Univariate analysis
Mean growth in PPE
Year 1 19% 36% 12% 0.00 20% 17% 0.09
Year 2 15% 27% 6% 0.00 15% 14% 0.46
Median growth in PPE
Year 1 12% 35% 3% 0.00 14% 10% 0.03
Year 2 8% 16% 3% 0.00 10% 6% 0.07
Mean growth in Adj. Assets
Year 1 18% 38% 11% 0.00 20% 13% 0.00
Year 2 13% 23% 6% 0.00 14% 12% 0.30
Median growth in Adj. Assets
Year 1 14% 40% 6% 0.00 18% 9% 0.00
Year 2 10% 22% 4% 0.00 11% 8% 0.03
Variable Year 1 Year 2
Growth in PPE Growth in Assets Growth in PPE Growth in Assets
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel B: Multivariate analysis for the whole sample
Intercept 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.06 0.45 0.10 0.06
State 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.71 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04
Success 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.00
State  Success 0.22 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.00
Growth in Sales 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.05
Return on Assets 0.01 0.99 0.09 0.77 0.80 0.08 0.17 0.62
Market Run-up 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.64 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.00
Cash Ratio 0.08 0.51 0.07 0.44 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.99
Leverage 0.10 0.30 0.28 0.00 0.07 0.39 0.18 0.00
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.91
Period 0.02 0.56 0.01 0.56 0.03 0.41 0.00 0.88
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 4.63% 11.47% 5.18% 6.71%
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tion term between them, State  Success. We include all control variables used in the regulatory decision mod-
el for two reasons. First, these variables are proxies for investment opportunities and the availability of capital
from other sources, which aﬀect investment. Second, by including the same set of controls in both the
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unpredicted shock to capital availability on ﬁrm investment. In a subsequent section, we use another approach
to further address the endogeneity issue, following Faulkender and Petersen (2009).
Panel B, Table 4 reports regression results. The coeﬃcient on State is positive and in most cases signiﬁcant
(0.08, p = 0.09 for Year 1 and 0.09, p = 0.02 for Year 2 using growth in PPE; 0.01, p = 0.71 for Year 1 and
0.06, p = 0.04 for Year 2 using growth in adjusted assets), suggesting that state ﬁrms invest more than non-
state ﬁrms if both are denied approval to issue equity. The coeﬃcient on Success is signiﬁcantly positive (0.24,
p = 0.00 for Year 1 and 0.20, p = 0.00 for Year 2 using growth in PPE; 0.24, p = 0.00 for Year 1 and 0.15,
p = 0.00 for Year 2 using growth in adjusted assets), suggesting that successful non-state ﬁrms invest more
than unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between State and Success is signiﬁcantly
negative (0.22, p = 0.00 for Year 1 and 0.20, p = 0.00 for Year 2 using growth in PPE; 0.17, p = 0.00 for
Year 1 and 0.16, p = 0.00 for Year 2 using growth in adjusted assets), suggesting that successful state ﬁrms
invest less than successful non-state ﬁrms. Collectively, these ﬁndings support Hypothesis 2 that non-state
ﬁrms exhibit greater sensitivities of investment to regulatory decisions than state ﬁrms.
Results for control variables are consistent with theoretical predictions and previous empirical ﬁndings. For
example, the coeﬃcient on Growth in Sales is positive and highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that fast-growing ﬁrms
invest more. Return on Assets is positive and signiﬁcant in Year 2 using growth in PPE.Market Run-up is posi-
tive and signiﬁcant in Year 2, consistent with investment in a high return state. Leverage is negative and sig-
niﬁcant using growth in adjusted assets, suggesting that ﬁrms with low debt capacity invest less. Cash Ratio,
Log of Capitalization and Period are insigniﬁcant.4.3. Stock performance after regulatory decisions
In this subsection, we examine stock performance over a 2-year period after regulatory decisions. We
choose a 2-year period because we believe it is long enough for investors to gain a full understanding of
whether a ﬁrm’s planned investment projects can be implemented and yield results. For successful ﬁrms,
the start date of the 2-year period is deﬁned as the date on which the prospectus is published. Most unsuccess-
ful ﬁrms do not announce the cancellation of oﬀerings or regulatory decisions. Hence, we estimate the date on
which investors learn that a stock oﬀering proposal will not be implemented. For successful ﬁrms, the average
number of days between the shareholder approval date and the prospectus publication date is about 235 days.
Because most ﬁrms publish their prospectus immediately after receiving regulatory approval, we treat the
average time interval between the shareholder approval date and the regulatory decision date as about 235
calendar days. Accordingly, we set the start date of the 2-year period for unsuccessful ﬁrms which do not
announce the cancellation of their oﬀering plans as the 235th day after the shareholder approval date. For
unsuccessful ﬁrms that actually announce the cancellation of their oﬀering plans, the start date is set as the
date of the cancellation announcement. The year in which a regulatory decision is ﬁrst known to investors
is deﬁned as Year 0.
Following Loughran and Ritter (1995), we match each sample ﬁrm with a control ﬁrm of similar size to
calculate its long-run abnormal stock return. This approach is less vulnerable to the skewness problem and
hence yields better-speciﬁed statistics for detecting long-run abnormal stock returns in comparison with a ref-
erence portfolio approach (Barber and Lyon, 1997). For our main analysis, we use the market value of equity
as a proxy for ﬁrm size. To ﬁnd a matching ﬁrm, on December 31 of Year 0 for a sample ﬁrm, we obtain all
other ﬁrms that do not issue new shares within the 2-year period surrounding the start date of the 2-year event
window and rank them by market value of equity. The ﬁrm with a market value closest to that of the sample
ﬁrm is chosen as its matched ﬁrm. We calculate both buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHAR) and
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) since ﬁnancial economists argue that both measures have their merits
and drawbacks (Fama, 1998; Barber and Lyon, 1997). Speciﬁcally, BHAR and CAR for sample Firm i from
the ﬁrst month until Month T are calculated in the following way:BHARi;T ¼
YT
t¼1
ð1þ ri;s;tÞ 
YT
t¼1
ð1þ ri;c;tÞ; ð5Þ
Fig. 2.
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XT
i¼1
ðri;s;t  ri;c;tÞ; ð6Þwhere ri,s,t is the raw return for sample Firm i during Month t and ri,c,t is the raw return for the corresponding
control ﬁrm during Month t.
Fig. 2 plots the BHARs and CARs for sample ﬁrms. Panels A and B show that successful non-state ﬁrms
perform signiﬁcantly better than unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. Panels C and D, however, indicate that success-
ful and unsuccessful state ﬁrms do not diﬀer in stock performance after regulatory decisions.
Table 5 reports results of our formal tests. Univariate test results, reported in Panel A, show that neither
successful nor unsuccessful state ﬁrms have pronounced abnormal stock returns and that the diﬀerences inStock performance after regulatory decisions. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a successful ﬁrm if it successfully oﬀers stock within 1 year of
ng shareholder approval for the proposal and is deﬁned as an unsuccessful ﬁrm otherwise. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its
te controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. BHAR
R for sample ﬁrm i from the ﬁrst month until Month T are calculated in the following ways:
BHARi;T ¼
YT
t¼1
ð1þ ri;s;tÞ 
YT
t¼1
ð1þ ri;c;tÞ
CARi;T ¼
XT
i¼1
ðri;s;t  ri;c;tÞ
ri,s,t is the tth monthly raw return for sample ﬁrm i and ri,c,t is the tth monthly raw return for the corresponding control ﬁrm. Panel A
ts the average BHAR (CAR) over a 24-month period after regulatory decisions for non-state ﬁrms and Panel C (D) plots the aver-
AR (CAR) over a 24-month period for state ﬁrms.
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cantly better than unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. The mean (median) BHAR for successful non-state ﬁrms over
the 2-year period is 26% (9%), whereas the mean (median) BHAR for unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms over the
same period is 11% (3%), and the diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant at the 0.00 level. The mean (median)Table 5
Stock performance after regulatory decisions. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a successful ﬁrm if it successfully oﬀers stock within 1 year of receiving
shareholder approval for the proposal and is deﬁned as an unsuccessful ﬁrm otherwise. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its ultimate
controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. BHAR and CAR
for sample ﬁrm i from the ﬁrst month until Month T are calculated in the following ways:
BHARi;T ¼
YT
t¼1
ð1þ ri;s;tÞ 
YT
t¼1
ð1þ ri;c;tÞ
CARi;T ¼
XT
i¼1
ðri;s;t  ri;c;tÞ
where ri,s,t is the tth monthly raw return for sample ﬁrm i and ri,c,t is the tth monthly raw return for the corresponding control ﬁrm. P-
values that are 0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests). In Panel B, p-values are after correction for heteroskedasticity.
All Non-state ﬁrms State ﬁrms
Successful Unsuccessful Diﬀerence Successful Unsuccessful Diﬀerence
N 736 40 48 383 265
Panel A: Univariate analysis
Mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns
12-Month 1% 19% 5% 0.01 0% 0% 0.87
24-Month 1% 26% 11% 0.00 0% 0% 0.95
Median buy-and-hold abnormal returns
12-Month 1% 6% 4% 0.01 2% 0% 0.84
24-Month 1% 9% 3% 0.00 1% 1% 0.88
Mean cumulative abnormal returns
12-Month 0% 17% 5% 0.01 0% 2% 0.61
24-Month 1% 27% 14% 0.00 1% 0% 0.85
Median cumulative abnormal returns
12-Month 2% 9% 5% 0.02 3% 1% 0.99
24-Month 0% 10% 8% 0.00 1% 1% 0.98
Variable 12-Month 24-Month
BHAR CAR BHAR CAR
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel B: Multivariate regressions for the whole sample
Intercept 0.04 0.67 0.04 0.66 0.11 0.38 0.08 0.57
State 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.45 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.05
Success 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.42 0.00
State  Success 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.40 0.00
Growth in Sales 0.01 0.79 0.01 0.87 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.20
Return on Assets 0.52 0.41 0.39 0.55 0.07 0.93 0.30 0.72
Market Run-up 0.01 0.93 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.78 0.06 0.46
Cash Ratio 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.53 0.14 0.47 0.05 0.82
Leverage 0.02 0.88 0.01 0.97 0.05 0.77 0.09 0.61
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.49
Period 0.02 0.69 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.83 0.02 0.82
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 0.57% 0.32% 0.83% 1.03%
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unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms over the same period is 14% (8%), and the diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant at the
0.00 level.
Panel B, Table 5 reports multivariate regression results. The explanatory and control variables are the same
as those reported in Table 4. The stock performance of unsuccessful state ﬁrms, State, is better than that of
unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms, and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the 24-month period. The coef-
ﬁcients on Success are positive and signiﬁcant (0.24, p = 0.00 for 12-month and 0.38, p = 0.00 for 24-month
using BHAR; 0.22, p = 0.01 for 12-month and 0.42, p = 0.00 for 24-month using CAR), suggesting that suc-
cessful non-state ﬁrms perform much better than unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients on the interac-
tion between Success and State are signiﬁcantly negative (0.25, p = 0.01 for 12-month and 0.38; p = 0.00
for 24-month using BHAR; 0.21, p = 0.02 for 12-month and 0.40, p = 0.00 for 24-month using CAR). This
result is similar to that based on subsequent investment, suggesting that successful state ﬁrms signiﬁcantly
underperform successful non-state ﬁrms, again supporting Hypothesis 2. Therefore, the stock performance
of non-state ﬁrms is sensitive to regulatory decisions, whereas that of state ﬁrms is not, even though they
are favored in the regulatory screening process.4.4. Alternative explanation?
Morck et al. (2000), among others, suggest that in certain countries such as China, stock prices do not accu-
rately reﬂect ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. It is possible that investors may not be able to diﬀerentiate between
ﬁrms with and without investment opportunities before the release of regulatory decisions and thus price these
ﬁrms similarly. If the Chinese government successfully distinguishes ﬁrms with investment opportunities from
those without investment opportunities and approves the former to conduct SEOs, then we observe approved
ﬁrms investing more than denied ﬁrms because the former have more investment opportunities. The regula-
tory decision also conveys useful information about SEO ﬁrms’ investment opportunities to the market.
Accordingly, investors bid up stock prices of ﬁrms approved for SEOs and drive down stock prices of ﬁrms
denied approval. This argument can explain why successful non-state ﬁrms have better long-term stock per-
formance than unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms. This argument, however, cannot explain why successful and
unsuccessful state ﬁrms do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in long-term investment and stock performance. In fact,
Gul et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the stock prices of state ﬁrms in China are less informative than those of non-state
ﬁrms. If the above reasoning is true, the diﬀerence in the long-run stock performance between successful and
unsuccessful state ﬁrms should be greater than that between successful and unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms, which
is contrary to our ﬁndings.5. Extensions and robustness tests
5.1. Debt ﬁnancing after regulatory decisions
We have argued that state ﬁrms have better access to bank credit or/and are more likely to receive govern-
ment ﬁnancial support, and thus their performance and investment are less likely to be aﬀected by regulatory
decisions regarding equity issuance. In contrast, non-state ﬁrms have diﬃculties getting bank credit, and there-
fore have to abandon investment opportunities if their SEO applications are rejected. To conﬁrm this conjec-
ture, we examine debt ﬁnancing after regulatory decisions. The literature on ﬁnancial development typically
examines both total debt ﬁnancing and long-term debt ﬁnancing (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
We thus calculate both the growth in long-term debt and total debt using the following formulas:Growth in Long-term Debti;t ¼ Long-term Debti;t  Long-term Debti;t1Long-term Debti;t1 ; ð7Þ
Growth in Debti;t ¼ Total Debti;t  Total Debti;t1Total Debti;t1 : ð8Þ
Table 6
Debt ﬁnancing after regulatory decisions. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a successful ﬁrm if it successfully oﬀers stock within 1 year of receiving
shareholder approval for the proposal and is deﬁned as an unsuccessful ﬁrm otherwise. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its ultimate
controlling shareholder is the government or as a private ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. Year 0 is the year in
which the regulatory decision on a ﬁrm’s stock oﬀering proposal is made. Growth in Long-term Debt and Growth in Total Debt are
calculated in the following ways:
Growth in Long-term Debt ¼ Long-term Debtt  Long-term Debtt1
Long-term Debtt1
Growth in Debti;t ¼ Total Debti;t  Total Debti;t1Total Debti;t1
P-values that are 0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests). In Panel B, p-values are after correction for heteroskedasticity.
Variable Year 1 Year 2
Growth in Long-term Debt Growth in Debt Growth in Long-term Debt Growth in Debt
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Intercept 0.79 0.01 0.77 0.00 0.04 0.87 0.28 0.05
State 0.31 0.04 0.02 0.80 0.22 0.09 0.13 0.04
Success 0.37 0.10 0.38 0.00 0.36 0.09 0.31 0.00
State  Success 0.40 0.10 0.24 0.06 0.34 0.14 0.31 0.01
Growth in Sales 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.43 0.02 0.73
Return on Assets 1.91 0.18 0.05 0.95 0.92 0.54 1.77 0.06
Market Run-up 0.89 0.06 0.54 0.02 0.65 0.13 0.52 0.01
Cash Ratio 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.25 0.11 0.03 0.71
Leverage 1.00 0.01 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.96 0.48 0.00
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.38
Period 0.28 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.26
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 1.50% 10.95% 0.00% 6.55%
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trol for those variables in Eq. (4). Results are reported in Table 6. We ﬁnd that that state ﬁrms obtain more
bank credit after regulatory decisions than non-state ﬁrms if both are denied approval to issue equity (coef-
ﬁcient on State is 0.31, p = 0.04 for Year 1 and 0.22, p = 0.09 for Year 2 using Growth in Long-term Debt; 0.13,
p = 0.04 for Year 2 using Growth in Debt). This potentially explains an earlier ﬁnding that the investment and
stock performance of state ﬁrms are not sensitive to regulatory decisions, while those of non-state ﬁrms are.
The coeﬃcients on State  Success are mostly negative and signiﬁcant (0.41, p = 0.10 for Year 1 using
Growth in Long-term Debt; 0.24, p = 0.06 for Year 1 and 0.31, p = 0.01 for Year 2 using Growth in Debt),
suggesting that successful state ﬁrms borrow less after obtaining equity capital.
Successful non-state ﬁrms appear to borrow signiﬁcantly more than unsuccessful non-state ﬁrms (coeﬃcient
on Success is 0.37 and p = 0.10 in Year 1 and 0.36 and p = 0.09 in Year 2 using Growth in Long Term Debt;
0.38 and p = 0.00 in Year 1 and 0.31 and p = 0.00 in Year 2 using Growth in Debt). This result suggests that
regulatory approval enables non-state ﬁrms to raise equity capital as well as gain better access to bank credit.
As a consequence, their ﬁnancial constraints are eased, enabling them to grow rapidly. Our result is consistent
with Cull and Xu (2005) and Ayyagari et al. (2010) who ﬁnd that non-state ﬁrms with bank ﬁnancing grow
faster than those without.
5.2. Politically connected non-state ﬁrms and central versus local state ﬁrms
Our results so far demonstrate that non-state ﬁrms are discriminated against in the regulatory screening
process. Previous studies suggest that political connections bring beneﬁts to connected ﬁrms around the world
(Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2008; Berkman et al., 2011) and that political connections are
associated with ineﬃciency (Fan et al., 2007; Hung et al., 2011). Is it possible that non-state ﬁrms can over-
come regulatory discrimination by building political connections? Are state ﬁrms controlled by the central
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ments? We conduct additional tests to examine these issues.
A non-state ﬁrm is identiﬁed as having a political connection if one or more of its executives or directors are
(were) members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference (CPPCC), hold (held) positions in central ministries or are (were) leaders of national industry organi-
zations.10 Industry organizations in China are government-controlled and many of them are actually
transformed from former industry administrative ministries.
In our main analysis, state ﬁrms are treated as a homogenous group in terms of their strategic importance
and their connections with regulators, which may not be the case in reality. The ultimate controlling share-
holders of state ﬁrms include the central government (including the State Asset Management Bureau or central
ministries) and local governments. Firms that are directly controlled by the central government could be more
strategically important and thus be treated more favorably in the screening process than those controlled by
local governments. Furthermore, ﬁrms that are controlled by the central government may have more direct,
stronger connections with central regulators than those controlled by local governments.
We run the following logistic regression to assess the impact of political connections on the screening out-
come among non-state ﬁrms and the impact of central versus local state ﬁrms:10 Bo
connecProbðSuccessitÞ ¼ a0 þ a1Central Stateit þ a2 Local Stateit þ a3 Politically Connectedit
þ a4Growth in Salesit þ a5Returns on Assetsit þ a6Market Run-upit
þ a7Cash Ratioit þ a8 Leverageit þ a9 Log of Capitalizationit þ a10 Periodit þ eit; ð9Þwhere Politically Connected takes a value of one if a non-state ﬁrm has a political connection and zero other-
wise; Central State takes a value of one if a ﬁrm is ultimately controlled by the central government and zero
otherwise; Local State takes a value of one if a ﬁrm is controlled by a local government and zero otherwise.
Results are reported in Panel A, Table 7. The coeﬃcient on Politically Connected is positive and signiﬁcant
(0.88, p = 0.08) and is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent (Chi-square = 0.001, p = 0.97) from that on Local State (0.87,
p = 0.01). Hence, non-state ﬁrms with political connections have a signiﬁcantly greater chance of surviving the
screening process than those without political connections. Further, the chance of surviving the screening pro-
cess for a politically connected non-state ﬁrm is comparable to that of a local state owned ﬁrm, suggesting that
non-state ﬁrms can largely overcome regulatory discrimination by building connections to regulators. This
result speaks to the value of political connections (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2008). However,
building political connections does not necessarily result in a desirable outcome for non-state ﬁrms as a whole
because politically connected ﬁrms crowd out unconnected ﬁrms in the capital allocation process. Panel A,
Table 7 also shows that central state ﬁrms are marginally signiﬁcantly more likely (Chi-square = 2.56,
p = 0.11) than local state ﬁrms to pass the screening process (1.25, p = 0.00 for central state ﬁrms versus
0.87, p = 0.01 for local state ﬁrms).
Based on the above results, when all other variables are held at their sample means, the probability of a
central state ﬁrm surviving the regulatory screening process is 65%. The probabilities are 56%, 56% and
35% for a local state ﬁrm, a politically connected non-state ﬁrm and a non-politically connected non-state
ﬁrm, respectively. Therefore, a central state ﬁrm has 16% ((65%  56%)/56%) more chance to pass the screen-
ing process than a local state ﬁrm or a politically connected non-state ﬁrm, and a politically connected non-
state ﬁrm has 60% ((56%  35%)/35%) more chance to pass the screening process than a non-politically con-
nected non-state ﬁrm.
Panel B, Table 7 presents results on the sensitivity of investment growth to regulatory decisions. There is
some evidence (based on growth in PPE in Year 1) that politically connected non-state ﬁrms behave in a man-
ner somewhat similar to state ﬁrms in that they invest more than their non-connected counterparts if both are
denied approval to issue equity (coeﬃcient on Political Connected is 0.15, p = 0.03) and that they invest less if
they receive approval to raise capital than their non-connected counterparts who also receive approval to raiseukari et al. (2008) ﬁnd that in many countries, newly privatized ﬁrms have political connections. Therefore, it is possible that some
ted non-state ﬁrms are former state ﬁrms and retain bureaucrats as their executives after the privatization.
Table 7
Political connections for non-state ﬁrms and state versus local state ﬁrms. Politically Connected takes a value of 1 if a non-state ﬁrm has
political connection at the national level and 0 otherwise; a non-state ﬁrm is deﬁned to have national-level political connection if one or
more of its managers or directors are (were) members of the NPC or the CPPCC, hold (held) positions in central ministries or are (were)
leaders of national professional societies or industry organizations. Central State takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm is ultimately controlled by the
central government and 0 otherwise. Local State takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm is controlled by a local government and 0 otherwise. P-values
that are 0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests). In Panels B and C, p-values are after correction for heteroskedasticity.
All
Estimate p-Value
Panel A: Determinants of successful oﬀerings
Intercept 9.27 0.00
Central State 1.25 0.00
Local State 0.87 0.01
Politically Connected 0.88 0.08
Growth in Sales 0.39 0.14
Return on Assets 18.45 0.00
Market Run-up 1.46 0.00
Cash ratio 2.56 0.01
Leverage 1.69 0.02
Log of Capitalization 0.53 0.00
Period 0.69 0.02
N 736
Pseudo R-square 19.16%
Year 1 Year 2
Growth in PPE Growth in Assets Growth in PPE Growth in Assets
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel B: Investment subsequent to regulatory decisions
Intercept 0.05 0.53 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.54 0.11 0.07
Central State 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.54 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.04
Local State 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.94 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.14
Politically Connected 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.80 0.03 0.65 0.00 0.94
Success 0.32 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.00
Central State  Success 0.24 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.20 0.00
Local State  Success 0.32 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.00
Politically Connected  Success 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.87
Growth in Sales 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.07
Return on Assets 0.02 0.97 0.05 0.88 0.82 0.07 0.19 0.58
Market Run-up 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.72 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.93
Cash ratio 0.08 0.53 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.41 0.01 0.89
Leverage 0.09 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.06 0.42 0.18 0.00
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.00
Period 0.02 0.53 0.01 0.74 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.98
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 4.94% 12.12% 4.80% 6.50%
12-Month 24-Month
BHAR CAR BHAR CAR
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel C: Stock performance subsequent to regulatory decisions
Intercept 0.03 0.78 0.03 0.79 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.39
Central State 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.31 0.01 0.36 0.00
Local State 0.01 0.84 0.00 0.95 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.14
Politically Connected 0.07 0.39 0.07 0.46 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.36
Success 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.05 0.53 0.00 0.54 0.00
Central State  Success 0.39 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.73 0.00 0.72 0.00
Local State  Success 0.27 0.04 0.22 0.10 0.48 0.01 0.47 0.01
Politically Connected  Success 0.09 0.56 0.07 0.66 0.40 0.04 0.32 0.13
Growth in Sales 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.66 0.07 0.22 0.06 0.32
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Table 7 (continued)
12-Month 24-Month
BHAR CAR BHAR CAR
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Return on Assets 0.62 0.31 0.48 0.45 0.23 0.73 0.15 0.86
Market Run-up 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.32
Cash ratio 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.38 0.17 0.43 0.10 0.65
Leverage 0.01 0.96 0.02 0.87 0.03 0.84 0.07 0.69
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.83 0.04 0.62 0.04 0.59
Period 0.04 0.47 0.02 0.73 0.04 0.54 0.01 0.89
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 0.76% 0.75% 1.57% 1.81%
O.Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 101–125 119capital (coeﬃcient on Political Connected  Success is 0.23, p = 0.05). Panel B, Table 7 also shows that local
state ﬁrms’ post-approval investment is similar to that of central state ﬁrms.
Panel C, Table 7 presents results on the sensitivity of stock performance to regulatory decisions. There is
some limited evidence that politically connected non-state ﬁrms perform worse after receiving approval to
issue equity than non-politically connected non-state ﬁrms that also receive approval (coeﬃcient on Political
Connected  Success is 0.40, p = 0.04 for 24-month BHAR). Also, after receiving approval to issue equity,
both central and local state ﬁrms perform worse than non-state ﬁrms and central state ﬁrms perform worse
than local state ﬁrms. These results are consistent with non-politically connected non-state ﬁrms being the
most ﬁnancially constrained, followed by politically connected non-state ﬁrms and then state ﬁrms.
5.3. Market reactions to SEO cancellation announcements
Market reactions to SEO cancellation announcements should diﬀer between non-state and state ﬁrms if
they have diﬀering degrees of ﬁnancial constraints. Speciﬁcally, market reactions to cancellation announce-
ments made by non-state ﬁrms should be worse than those made by state ﬁrms because investors likely further
discount the possibility that non-state ﬁrms will be able to implement their investment projects. Unfortunately,
not all ﬁrms announce the cancellation of oﬀering proposals. Within our sample, only 9 non-state ﬁrms and 42
state ﬁrms announced the cancellation of stock oﬀerings after shareholder approval of those proposals.
We deﬁne the announcement date as the event day. To control for the impact of information leakage and
delayed reactions, we use a 5-day event window from 3 trading days before until 1 day after the announcement
date. The size-matched ﬁrms deﬁned in the previous section are used as benchmarks to calculate 5-day cumu-
lative abnormal returns (CARs). Untabulated results show that the mean (median) abnormal stock return dur-
ing the 5-day period surrounding the cancellation announcement for a non-state ﬁrm is 1.42% (1.77%),
whereas the stock price of a state-controlled ﬁrm climbs by a mean (median) of 1.04% (0.34%) during the same
window. The diﬀerence between the two groups, 2.46% (2.11%), is signiﬁcant at the 5% (8%) level. Table 8
reports multivariate regression results. The explanatory and control variables are the same as those reported
in Tables 4 and 5. Results suggest that market reactions surrounding the cancellation announcements are sig-
niﬁcantly worse for non-state ﬁrms than for state ﬁrms (the coeﬃcient on State is 0.03, p = 0.06). Market reac-
tions are more negative for ﬁrms with good investment opportunities (coeﬃcient on Growth in Sales is 0.05,
p = 0.08) and for ﬁrms with less cash on hand (coeﬃcient on Cash Ratio is 0.16; p = 0.00). The results suggest
that ﬁrms with more ﬁnancial constraints and more investment opportunities are more adversely aﬀected by
unsuccessful stock oﬀerings.
5.4. Further attempt to mitigate the endogeneity concern
To further mitigate the endogeneity concern, we follow Faulkender and Petersen (2009) and decompose
Success into two components, the predicted probability of passing the screening obtained in Model (1)
(Prob(Success)) and the residual deﬁned as the diﬀerence between Success and Prob(Success) (Residual(Suc-
cess)). Residual(Success) represents the unpredicted portion of a shock to capital availability and thus the
Table 8
Market reaction to stock oﬀering cancellation announcements. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its
ultimate controlling shareholder is the government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling
shareholders are individuals. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of the diﬀerence between a
sample ﬁrm and its size-matched ﬁrm in terms of the daily stock return from 3 trading days before to 1
trading day after the event day, where the event day is the day on which the oﬀering proposal
cancellation announcement is made. P-values after correction for heteroskedasticity that are 0.10 or
smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests).
Estimate p-Value
Intercept 0.19 0.54
State 0.03 0.06
Growth in Sales 0.05 0.08
Return on Assets 0.16 0.35
Market Run-up 0.07 0.24
Cash ratio 0.16 0.00
Leverage 0.08 0.13
Log of Capitalization 0.01 0.44
Period Dummy 0.01 0.70
N 51
Adj. R-square 13.03%
Table 9
Alternative approach to address the endogeneity issue. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholder is the
government or as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholders are individuals. Prob(Success) is the predicted probability of
passing the screening based on Model (1), and Residual(Success) is the diﬀerence between Success and Prob(Success). P-values after
correction for heteroskedasticity that are 0.10 or smaller are highlighted in bold (two-sided tests).
Year 1 Year 2
Growth in PPE Growth in Assets Growth in PPE Growth in Assets
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel A: Investment subsequent to regulatory decisions
Constant 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.75 0.02 0.41
Prob(Success) 0.24 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.52 0.13 0.03
Prob(Success)  State 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.03 0.50
Residual(Success) 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.16 0.00
Residual(Success)  State 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.17 0.00
Growth in Sales 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.12
Return on Assets 0.06 0.87 0.86 0.00 1.02 0.01 0.54 0.08
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.89
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 3.36% 8.06% 5.03% 4.19%
12-Month 24-Month
BHAR CAR BHAR CAR
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel B: Stock performance subsequent to regulatory decisions
Constant 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.94 0.04 0.53
Prob(Success) 0.08 0.43 0.09 0.37 0.07 0.65 0.04 0.80
Prob(Success)  State 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.61
Residual(Success) 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.08
Residual(Success)  State 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.06
Growth in Sales 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.76 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.35
Return on Assets 0.65 0.26 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.59 0.38 0.59
Log of Capitalization 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.29
N 736 736 736 736
Adj. R-square 0.63% 0.36% 0.00% 0.03%
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O.Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 101–125 121coeﬃcient on it can better capture the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrm investment and stock perfor-
mance. Similar to Faulkender and Petersen (2009), we include proxies for investment opportunities (Growth
in Sales), operating cash ﬂow (Return on Assets) and ﬁrm size (Log of Capitalization).
We report results in Table 9. The predicted component of Success, Prob(Success), is in general positively
associated with investment growth (Panel A) but is not associated with stock returns (Panel B). There is also
some limited evidence that the eﬀect of Prob(Success) on investment growth and stock returns is smaller for
state ﬁrms than for non-state ﬁrms (coeﬃcients on Prob(Success)  State are 0.13, p = 0.01 for Growth in
Assets in Year 1; 0.14, p = 0.07 for 12-month BHAR; 0.12, p = 0.09 for 12-month CAR). These results sug-
gest that regulatory decisions regarding SEO applications are somewhat related to the investment opportuni-
ties individual ﬁrms have and thus highlights the importance of including the determinants of the screening
outcome in the investment and stock performance models, as is done in the main analysis section.
The more interesting results are on the unpredicted component of Success, Residual(Success). The coeﬃ-
cients on Residual(Success) are positive and signiﬁcant except for the 24-month BHAR and the coeﬃcients
on Residual(Success)  State are negative and negative except for Growth in PPE in Year 1. These results sug-
gest that an unpredicted approval boosts investment signiﬁcantly for non-state ﬁrms but not for state ﬁrms,
supporting Hypothesis 2. To the extent that Residual(Success) largely captures an exogenous shock to capital
availability and that the two types of ﬁrms have diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial constraints, ﬁndings here are
robust evidence that ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect ﬁrm investment and stock performance.
5.5. Robustness analyses
5.5.1. Alternative benchmarks for calculating abnormal stock returns
We use equal- or value-weighted market portfolios as benchmarks. We also use total sales or total assets as
a proxy for size to determine the size-matched non-SEO ﬁrms. Untabulated results obtained using these
benchmarks are qualitatively similar to those in our main analysis.
5.5.2. Including ﬁrms that cancel oﬀering proposals before shareholder approval
In arriving at the ﬁnal sample, we exclude ﬁrms that announced stock oﬀering plans and then withdrew
such plans before the relevant shareholder meetings. To the extent that these ﬁrms might have withdrawn their
oﬀering plans under pressure from regulators, the results we describe above may underestimate the percentage
of ﬁrms that are screened out by regulators. If ﬁrms withdrawing their applications have characteristics dif-
ferent from those that do not withdraw but fail to pass regulatory screening, then results in Table 3 could
be biased. Untabulated results show that after the inclusion of the 44 ﬁrms that withdrew their oﬀering plans
before forwarding them to shareholder meetings, our inferences remain largely unchanged.
5.5.3. Including industry dummies as determinants of regulatory decisions
Non-state and state ﬁrms may have diﬀerent industry distributions. It is possible that governments may
support some industries more than others. To determine the robustness of our results, we add industry dum-
mies and re-run Model (1). We follow industry classiﬁcations issued by the CSRC and divide sample ﬁrms into
22 industries. Untabulated results show that the coeﬃcient on State remains signiﬁcantly positive (0.73,
p = 0.01) after the inclusion of 21 industry dummies.
5.5.4. Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities
We next replace Growth in Sales with Tobin’s Q in the investment regressions. Main results are qualitatively
similar (untabulated). Take Growth in PPE in the ﬁrst year as an example. The coeﬃcient on State is 0.08
(p = 0.08). The coeﬃcient on Success is 0.27 (p = 0.00), while the coeﬃcient on State  Success is 0.26
(p = 0.00).
6. Conclusion
In this study we examine the eﬀect of state control on ﬁrms’ access to capital in China, where the
government controls the equity capital allocation process. We also examine the consequences of this
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equity than non-state ﬁrms. Non-state ﬁrms exhibit greater sensitivities to regulatory decisions as reﬂected
in their post-decision investment growth and stock performance than state ﬁrms. This result implies that
non-state ﬁrms, being more ﬁnancially constrained than state ﬁrms, should beneﬁt more from being able
to raise equity capital. Collectively, ﬁndings in this study suggest that the screening process leads to
capital misallocation and impedes the growth of non-state ﬁrms. We provide robust evidence that polit-
ical intervention results in capital allocation ineﬃciency and that ﬁnancing frictions cause
underinvestment.
We also show that non-state ﬁrms with political connections are more likely to receive approval to issue
new equity than unconnected non-state ﬁrms. The likelihood of a politically connected non-state ﬁrm passing
the regulatory screening process is comparable to that of a state ﬁrm. We thus provide direct evidence that
politically connected ﬁrms in the private sector beneﬁt from favorable regulatory treatment, which gives
non-state ﬁrms strong incentives to build such connections.
Our paper is relevant to the current debate about the role of the government in the economy amid a global
ﬁnancial and economic crisis. Our results suggest ineﬃciency and misallocation of resources due to govern-
ment ownership or government intervention. While the economic and institutional setting in China is diﬀerent
to that of developed countries and we are hesitant to extrapolate excessively, results from our analysis should
be of reference and use to these economies. An important lesson from the current ﬁnancial crisis is that ﬁnanc-
ing frictions are real and of ﬁrst-order importance (Kashyap and Zingales, 2010). Our work helps researchers
and regulators better understand this issue.
The Chinese government established the Medium and Small Enterprise Listing Board in late 2004 and
the Growth Enterprise Board in 2009. As a result, many non-state ﬁrms are now allowed to access the stock
market to raise capital. Our work suggests that this development could ease ﬁnancial constraints for non-
state ﬁrms and result in faster growth. Future research can further explore this issue based on this new
development.
Despite the fact that the Chinese government has signiﬁcantly improved equality in capital allocation in
recent years, it is still widely believed that private entrepreneurs face serious obstacles in obtaining capital
(China Financial and Economic News, March 6, 2009). Our study generates useful implications to policymak-
ers and supports ﬁnancial reforms that further promote equal access to capital for ﬁrms with diﬀerent own-
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No. 7200080).Appendix A. CSRC guidelines on SEOs
Requirements for rights issues listed in CSRC [1999] 12, for example, include:
1. The listed company should be independent from its controlling shareholder in terms of its staﬀ, prop-
erty, and ﬁnance.
2. The applicant’s corporate charter should be in compliance with the Company Law.
3. The use of capital raised should be consistent with the state’s industrial policies.
4. There should be at least one complete ﬁscal year between a new application and the previous successful
equity oﬀering.
O.Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 101–125 1235. The average ROE in the 3 years before the year of application should be no lower than 10% and the
ROE should be no lower than 6% in any of the three previous years. The minimum average ROE
can be lowered to 9% for applicants in the agriculture, energy, raw materials, infrastructure, and
high-tech industries.
6. The applicant should not have any record of material accounting fraud or negligence in the past 3 years.
7. The forecast ROE after an oﬀering should be no lower than the interest rate for bank deposits over the
same period.
8. Only common stock can be issued and new shares should be issued to existing shareholders only.
9. The number of new shares issued cannot usually be more than 30% of the number of outstanding shares
before an oﬀering.
These guidelines also list some negative conditions that may lead to the denial of SEO applications. The
negative criteria speciﬁed in CSRC [1999] 12 are as follows:
1. Failure to fulﬁll information disclosure obligations as required by laws and regulations.
2. Having a record of any material legal or regulatory violation in the past 3 years.
3. Using capital raised in the last oﬀering in a manner inconsistent with the purpose stated in the
prospectus.
4. Failure to conduct the shareholders meeting in the manner required by the Company Law.
5. Including misleading statements in the application.
6. Setting the oﬀer price lower than the net asset value per share.
7. Providing collateral for bank loans to its shareholders or other individuals.
8. Any signiﬁcant related-party transaction between the applicant and its controlling shareholder that
clearly hurts the interests of minority shareholders or occupation of the applicant’s property or funds
by the controlling shareholder.
Other than for the proﬁtability requirements, the positive and negative criteria speciﬁed in the various
guidelines are mostly the same.
Appendix B. Variable deﬁnitionsVariable name Deﬁnition or calculationAssets Total assets at the end of the year before the oﬀering announcement
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return
Capitalization The market value of equity at the end of the year before the oﬀering announcement
CAR Cumulative abnormal return
Cash Ratio The ratio of cash and cash equivalents over total assets at the end of the year before the
oﬀering announcement
Central State =1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder of a sample ﬁrm is the central government and 0
otherwise
Non-state Firm A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a non-state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholder(s) is (are) (an)
individual(s)
Growth in Assets The growth rate of total assets adjusted by cash and cash equivalents
Growth in PPE The growth rate of net property, plant and equipment
Growth in Sales The growth rate of sales in the year before the oﬀering announcement
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets at the end of the year before the oﬀering
announcement
Market Run-up Equally weighted market returns over the 12-month period before the board announcement
date
(continued on next page)
124 O.Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 101–125Appendix B (continued)Variable name Deﬁnition or calculationPeriod =1 if a sample ﬁrm announces its oﬀering proposal after 2001 and 0 otherwise
Politically
Connected=1 if a non-state ﬁrm has a political connection at the national level and 0 otherwise; a non-
state ﬁrm is considered to have a national-level political connection if one or more of its
managers or directors are (were) members of NPC or CPPCC, hold (held) positions in
central ministries or are (were) leaders of national professional societies or industry
organizationsReturn on Assets The average ratio of net income over total assets over the 3 years before the oﬀering
announcementSales Total sales earned in the year before the oﬀering announcement
State Firm A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a state ﬁrm if its ultimate controlling shareholder is the government
Success =1 if a ﬁrm successfully oﬀers new shares within a year of its shareholders approving the
oﬀering proposal and 0 otherwiseReferences
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